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"The power of taxation is a fundamental and imperious
necessity of all governments and not to be restricted by mere
legal fictions."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Rodgers,2 the Supreme Court clarified the extent of the federal government's power to force the sale of jointly
held property in which at least one but not all holders of an interest
is liable on a tax debt. Resolving a conflict between the courts of appeals, 3 the Court held the government could force a sale even if the
1. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930).
2. 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983). Rodgers also had a companion case, Ingram v. City of Dallas
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Rehab., 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983). Because the facts of Rodgers present a
clearer application of § 7403, the Ingram case will be disregarded except where its facts require
special consideration.
3. Compare United States v. Rogers, 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981) (government could not
foreclose federal tax liens on homestead interest of deceased taxpayer so long as innocent
spouse maintained homestead under Texas law), rev'd on appeal, 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983) [respondent's name is misspelled in the Fifth Circuit case]; United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d
677 (10th Cir. 1973) (where wife owns undivided one-half interest in homestead under Kansas
law, such interest was immune from seizure and sale to enforce federal tax lien against the
husband's interest in the property, so long as wife was living on the property); and Folsom v.
United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962) (federal government cannot force sale of property of
six joint owners of Alabama real property in proceeding to enforce its lien against taxpayerjoint owner) with United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972) (where delinquent taxpayer owned property as tenant in common with his wife, federal government could sell entire
property, rather than just the undivided one-half interest of taxpayer, but would retain only
the proceeds attributable to the delinquent taxpayer's interest), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (taxpayer's undivided one-half
interest in marital property was property within reach of a federal tax lien, based on taxpayer's
antenuptial tax liability); and Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968) (where
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tax debtor, acting alone, could not.4 The Court found property could

potentially be subject to a forced sale if the tax debtor has or had
any interest in the property. 5 The state-created limitations on alienation of property interests held by innocent joint owners no longer automatically barred the sale.' The Court indicated, however, that district courts should evaluate certain equitable considerations prior to
7
authorization of a forced sale.
A government's ability to function properly depends upon its ability to levy and collect taxes. Article I, section 8 of the United States
Constitution grants taxing authority to the United States government." Much of Title 26 of the United States Code, commonly called
the "Tax Code," is devoted to levying of taxes. 9 The propriety of any
particular tax or the application of any particular Code section to a
factual setting is beyond the purview of this paper. The focus of this
paper is, instead, the ability of the federal government to collect
taxes"0 and, more specifically, its ability to force the sale of property
in which a delinquent taxpayer holds or held an interest.
II.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Chapter 64 of the Tax Code 1 provides general guidelines for collection of federal taxes. The collection mechanism would be unnecessary if all persons paid the taxes assessed against them, 2 despite the
existence of disputes over the amount. Obviously, such a situation
has little to do with the realities of a complex society, and the government must collect taxes when taxed persons do not voluntarily
forward payment.
Section 6321 of the Tax Code' 3 provides for a lien in favor of the
federal government upon all property, and rights to property, belonging to any person neglecting to pay any tax. The lien, a charge
taxpayer's farm was sold to satisfy federal tax lien, wife's inchoate dower interest was subject to
termination by the sale with that interest being satisfied from the proceeds before the remainder could be applied to the tax lien), reh'g denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 2142-43.
5. Id. at 2142.
6. Id. at 2146.
7. Id. at 2149.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
9. I.R.C. §§ 1-904 (1982).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11. I.R.C. ch. 64 (West 1984).
12. "Person" will be used throughout this paper as a generic term to refer to any entity
that may incur a tax liability. Note also that the male pronouns, "he," "his" and "him," will
likewise be employed generically.
13. I.R.C. § 6321 (West 1984).
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against specific property, 14 acts as an encumbrance on the property.
If the tax debtor wants to alienate or transfer the property he first
must satisfy his debt to the government. Because the government
must wait until either the tax debtor desires to alienate the property
or it passes at the tax debtor's death before it may actually collect
the tax dollars due, the lien mechanism alone is not a very powerful
governmental weapon. 1 5 Therefore, section 6331 of the Tax Code allows the government to levy upon all property and property rights
belonging to the tax debtor. 16 The government may seize the property or property right and sell it to collect the assessed taxes. 1 7 The
lien procedure of section 6321 and the levy power of section 6331
seem to provide a potent threat, encouraging tax debtors to satisfy
their tax obligations.
Yet another enforcement procedure is found in section 7403 of the
Tax Code. Section 7403 permits the Attorney General, or his delegate, to file a civil action in federal district court to enforce a federal
lien on any property or property interest of a delinquent taxpayer, or
to subject "any property, of whatever nature,. . . or in which he has
any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability."'' 8
The provision provides that all persons claiming any interest in the
property involved in the civil action must be made parties to that
action.' 9
At first section 7403 appears either unnecessary in light of section
6331's direct levy power, or merely provides an alternative to direct
levy. If the "property" reached by section 7403 is the same as the
"property" reached by section 6331, the government would have little
impetus to pursue the more lengthy and costly procedure dictated by
section 7403. Section 7403 requires action in federal district court,
while under section 6331 the property may be directly seized. Other
than the desire to avoid a possibly wrongful or inadvertent seizure of
the property of innocent third parties, virtually no reason exists for
the government to incur the expense of judicial proceedings.20 If,
however, the "property" subject to section 7403 exceeds the "property" within the reach of section 6331, section 7403 would constitute
14. United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 115 n.30 (3d Cir. 1964).
15. The tax debtor also may be subject to certain criminal sanctions or forfeitures provided for in chapter 75 of the Tax Code (I.R.C. ch. 75 (1982)). These penalties, however, are
beyond the scope of this paper.
16. I.R.C. § 6331 (West 1984).
17. I.R.C. § 6332 (West 1984). Section 6331 requires no judicial proceedings; it allows for
direct seizure and sale of the property by the government. Id.
18. I.R.C. § 7403(a) (West 1984).
19. I.R.C. § 7403(b) (West 1984).
20. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2144.
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an additional weapon in the government's collection arsenal.
In recent years, the federal government has begun employing section 7403 to reach property normally not subject to levy. Although
the basic elements of the section date back to 1868 revenue legislation,2 1 only recently has the government attempted to use section
7403 to reach property interests held by a tax debtor as a joint
owner. 22 Specifically, section 7403 has been employed to force the
sale of jointly held property even though some of the property holders did not owe a tax debt to the government and their interests, as
defined by state law, were beyond the reach of the other joint owners
or their creditors.2 3
III.

PRECEDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT

Case law has created two fundamental principles regarding the
reach of federal tax liens and the ability of the federal government to
satisfy those liens through a forced sale. First, state-created creditors'
exemptions for either specific property or an interest in property held
by a debtor are insufficient to bar a federal tax lien and levy on such
"property" or "interest in property. 2 4 A state may not constrain federal tax collection by attempting to place certain property of a debtor
beyond the reach of ordinary creditors.2 5 A state also may not compel
the federal government to comply with local procedural rules to perfect the tax lien. 6 The Tax Code contains the only procedural prerequisites and property exemptions recognized by the federal government.2 Under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution any state-legislated creditors' rights are superseded by
21. Id. at 2137. See also An Act imposing Taxes on distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for
other Purposes, § 106, 15 Stat. 125, 167 (1868). The language of the 1868 legislation is virtually
identical to the present § 7403.
22. The case in which the government first sought to invoke § 7403 in a joint ownership
situation appears to be Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361, 367 n.10 (5th Cir. 1962). Several
cases subsequent to Folsom also addressed the application of § 7403. See, e.g., Ingram v. City of
Dallas Dep't of Hous. & Urban Rehab., 649 F.2d 1128 (1981), reh'g denied, 659 F.2d 1075 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904 (1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983); United States v.
Rogers, 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir.
1973); United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Overman, 424
F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964).
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
24. United States v. Mitchell, 430 U.S. 190 (1971). See 9 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 54.52 (1982); W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIEN 19-20 (1972).
25. See United States v. Mitchell, 430 U.S. 190 (1971). See also Rogers, 649 F.2d at 1127.
26. United States v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961); Aquilino v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
27. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6323(f), 6334 (West 1984).
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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federal law. Therefore, the federal tax collector cannot be treated
merely as an ordinary creditor of the debtor.
The second basic principle is that, with regard to the reach of federal tax liens, the terms "property" and "rights to property" are defined under state law. 29 Under this principle, the applicable state law

might control the reach of federal liens. The Supreme Court has
stated that in applying a federal revenue act, state law determines
the nature of the taxpayer's legal interest in the property."0
Despite this apparent contradiction, in most situations these two
principles will not conflict. After determining a person's tax debt, the
government looks to state law to classify the "property" or "interest
in property" held by the tax debtor. The government would not be
prevented from seizing this property merely because a state-created
exemption would have placed it beyond the reach of ordinary
creditors. 1
When applying section 7403, however, the possibility for conflict
does exist,32 particularly when the tax debtor holds property in which
an innocent party also has an interest. In such a case the federal government would again look to state law to determine the interests held
by both the tax debtor and any other affected person. Section 7403
sanctions the sale of property in which the tax debtor has any interest.3 3 Yet problems can arise when state law either prohibits the tax
debtor, acting alone, from selling the property, or when it prohibits a
third party's interest from being affected by debts incurred solely by
the tax debtor. These protections, rather than acting as mere statecreated exemptions,
are inherent in the state-defined property
4
3

interest.

Because of this conflict, the circuit courts were unable to agree on
the scope of section 7403. In Folsom v. United States,3 5 the Fifth
Circuit held that section 7403 gave the government no greater rights
in jointly held property than those held by the tax debtor.3 6 Folsom
involved property held in joint tenancy in which only one of the hold29. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2137, citing United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958).
See also Aquilino v United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960).
30. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960), citing Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 626 (1940).
31. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971).
32. I.R.C. § 7403 (West 1984).
33. I.R.C. § 7403 (West 1984).
34. For example, the "homestead right" held by Mrs. Rodgers was determined to be a
vested property right. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2139. See also the discussion of the nature of Mrs.
Rodgers' right. Id.
35. 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
36. Id. at 367.
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ers was a tax debtor.3 7 The Folsom court equated the government's
power over the property with the power the tax debtor had under
state law.38 The court stated that although the government could se-

cure the tax debtor's interest, the tax debtor could not automatically
have forced a sale of the property and, therefore, neither could the
government.3 " The other joint tenants' rights, under state law, to
have the property partitioned in-kind were superior to the government's right to sell the property.4"
A few years after Folsom, the Seventh Circuit addressed a similar
factual setting and reached a contrary result. In United States v.
Trilling,41 the court found that section 7403 allowed the government
to force the sale of an entire parcel of property in which the tax
debtor was a joint tenant.42 When the sale was consummated, the

government had to apportion the proceeds among itself and other
joint tenants.43 The Trilling court specifically refused to follow the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in the Folsom case.44 The Fourth Circuit,
in Washington v. United States,45 agreed with the Trilling court and
held that a wife's inchoate dower interest in her husband's property
could be terminated by the sale of the property under section 7403.41
In United States v. Kocher,47 the Second Circuit also disregarded the
Folsom decision, finding that section 7403 authorized the sale of
property in which a husband, a tax debtor, and wife were tenants in
common, so long as the wife received an appropriate allocation of the
proceeds for her interest."
In United States v. Overman 49 the Ninth Circuit allowed a sale of
community property in which only one of the owners was a tax
debtor. The Overman court stated that section 7403 permits the district court to subject the interests of third parties to an involuntary
conversion when enforcing a tax lien on the delinquent taxpayer's interests in the same property.50 The court emphasized that the gov37. Id. at 362 (tax debtor in Folsom had a one-sixth undivided interest in certain real
estate located in Alabama).
38. Id. at 368.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 702-03.
44. Id.
45. 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 7. The court provided that the wife was to be compensated for the value of her
dower interest. Id.
47. 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 506-07.
49. 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 1146.
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ernment cannot retain more than the share attributable to the taxpayer's interest in the property from the sale. The government is not
entitled to the proceeds attributable to the third parties' interest. 51
The Washington52 and Overman53 courts literally applied section

7403, but failed to address the possible conflict between state definition of property interests and the federal government's power under
section 7403. 5' These courts did not clearly define the nature of the
interest held by the affected third parties. The possibility that the
interests of the third parties were inherent in the state's definition of
property, and not state-created exemptions, was left unexplored. 55
The Fifth Circuit reconsidered the applicability of section 7403 to
jointly held property in United States v. Rogers.56 In Rogers, Philip
Bosco and his wife, Lucille Mitzy Bosco Rodgers, then Lucille Mitzy
Bosco, had purchased a residence in Texas and occupied it as their
homestead.57 After they acquired the property, Bosco, individually,
incurred federal wagering taxes and penalties which he failed to pay
before his death. After Bosco's death, his wife continued to occupy
the property.58 Due to her relationship to Bosco and the property,
she acquired a homestead interest in the property. 59 The government
sued Mrs. Rodgers under the authority of section 7403. The government sought enforcement of its tax liens, created under section
6321,60 and the forced sale of the property in which Mrs. Rodgers still
6 1
had the homestead right.

The homestead right, created under both Texas state law and the
Texas Constitution, gives each spouse a separate and undivided possessory interest in the homestead. The homestead right may be lost
only by death or abandonment and may not be compromised by the
51. Id.
52. 402 F.2d at 3.
53. 424 F.2d at 1142.
54. Overman, 424 F.2d at 1145; Washington, 402 F.2d at 7.
55. In United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973), the Tenth Circuit also
reached contrary to those of the Fifth. The Hershbergercourt disallowed a levy on property in
which a wife, a non-tax debtor, held a homestead right under Kansas law. Id. at 682; see also
Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2156 n.7. Notably, however, the Tenth Circuit later partially discredited
its decision in Hershberger,limiting it to the proposition that § 7403 did not require a sale of
property in which an affected party held a homestead right. Tillery v. Parks, 630 F.2d 775, 777
(10th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1974). The
Hershbergercourt decided that once a valid lien was established, a court could order foreclosure under § 7403 at its discretion. Tillery, 630 F.2d at 777, citing Eaves, 499 F.2d at 871.
56. 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981); Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2139 n.13.
57. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2139.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. I.R.C. § 6321 (West 1984).
61. Rogers, 649 F.2d at 1119.
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other spouse or by his heirs.6 2 Exempt from forced sale, the homestead right requires the consent of both spouses to any encumbrance
by lien, other than purchase money, property tax, and materialmen's
liens."' The homestead right vests in each spouse and is in some respects similar to an undivided life estate in the property.6 4
The Fifth Circuit recognized that mere state-created exemptions
from the claims of general creditors were insufficient to bar a federal
levy for the collection of taxes.6 5 According to the court, however, the
Texas homestead right is not a mere exemption. Instead, it is, as defined by the state, a vested interest in the property. 6 The court ruled
that Mrs. Rodgers possessed a property right separate from that of
her deceased husband and, as such, it was not subject to levy.67 The
government could only levy on Bosco's property subject to Mrs. Rodgers' interest.6 8 The gove:rnment could either sell a future interest in
one-half of the property(" or wait until Mrs. Rodgers' interest terminated upon abandonment or death.
The court devoted most of its analysis to a determination of the
nature and extent of Mrs. Rodgers' interest in the property. 0 The
Fifth Circuit refused to deviate from the basic reasoning of the Folsom case 71 and merely nobed that an opposing view had been adopted
by other circuits.' 2 Since Bosco could not have alienated Mrs. Rodgers' homestead interest, the Fifth Circuit stated that the government was also barred from selling the property. 3
62. Id. at 1120, citing TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50 and TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Vernon
1975).
63. 649 F.2d at 1120.
64. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2138-39. See also Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 869
(Tex. 1978) ("This homestead right . . . has been held to be one in the nature of legal life
estate or life estate created by operation of law.").
65. Rogers, 649 F.2d at 1122.
66. Id. at 1127.
67. Id. at 1128.
68. Id.
69. Mr. Bosco's interest was limited to one-half of the property because Texas is a community property state. The Supreme Court did not clearly address the impact of Mrs. Rodgers'
community property interest. Although, under its holding Mrs. Rodgers' community property
interest might also place the property beyond the reach of Mr. Bosco's individual creditors, this
possibility will not be sufficient to bar application of § 7403. See United States v. Overman, 424
F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (community property subject to § 7403 sale even when state law
protected property from claims of one spouse's creditors). See also Broday v. United States,
455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972) (court allowed levy upon a community property checking account
when tax debt was that of only one spouse).
70. Rogers, 649 F.2d at 1120-28.
71. See 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
72. Rogers, 649 F.2d at 1125 n.12.
73. Id. at 1127.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

United States v. Rodgers presented the Supreme Court the opportunity to settle the conflict in the courts of appeals regarding the
proper reach of section 7403. 4 Although the Supreme Court agreed
with the Fifth Circuit that Mrs. Rodgers had a vested property interest, the Court held that this interest did not preclude the application
of section 7403. The Court stated that "[s]ection 7403(a) provides,
not only that the Government may 'enforce [its] lien,' but also that it
may seek to 'subject any property, [of] whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment
' State law determines whether the tax
of such tax or liability."75
debtor has an interest in any given parcel of property. 6 If he does,
section 7403 permits the sale of the property regardless of other interests in the property held by third parties.77 In short, the existence
of Bosco's interest in the property allowed a sale of the property
under section 7403. Mrs. Rodgers' homestead interest could not auto78
matically bar the sale.

Section 7403 may not, however, act to abrogate the fifth amendment rights of affected third parties.79 The taking of property partially belonging to affected third parties requires compensation. The
government must determine the value of any third party interests in
the property. Upon a section 7403 sale, the proceeds must then be
apportioned among the government, which is entitled to that portion
attributable to the tax debtor's interest, and the affected third
parties. s0
Despite finding authority for such sales under section 7403, the
majority recognized that district courts have discretion in determining whether a section 7403 sale is appropriate in a particular factual
setting." The Rodgers majority stated that the district courts should
consider how greatly the government's financial interests would be
prejudiced if its only option were a forced sale of the partial interest
held by the delinquent taxpayer.8 The district courts should also
74.
75.

Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2141.
Id. at 2142 (emphasis in original).

76. Id. at 2142-43.
77.

Id.

78. Id. at 2143.
79. Id. at 2144. "[I]f § 7403 allowed for the gratuitous confiscation of one person's property interests in order to satisfy another person's tax indebtedness, such a provision might pose
significant difficulties under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. See also U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. "[S]ection [7403] only used the third party's interest to facilitate extraction
of the property interest of the delinquent taxpayer." 59 J. TAX'N 120 (1983).
80. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2144-45 & n.25.
81. Id. at 2149.
82. Id. at 2151. The Court stated that if it were shown that a partial sale would not
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consider the expectations of the affected third parties and possible
prejudice to them.8 3 The relative values of the property interest held
by the affected third parties and by the delinquent taxpayer should
also be taken into consideration, 4 and the Court intimated that
other equitable concerns might be relevant in particular cases.85 The
Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's holding in Rogers with
directions to remand the case to the Northern District Court of
Texas. The district court was to consider whether equitable considerations inherent in section 7403 would discourage a forced sale of the
property.8 6
V. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court in Rodgers chose not to rely solely on the
wording of section 7403. Instead, it began its analysis by examining
precedential support,8 7 placing some reliance upon Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co.8 In Excelsior Refining, decided more than
ninety years ago, the Supreme Court had recognized the possibility
that the government could levy on property in which not all of the
interest holders were tax debtors. The Court held that, at least in
certain limited situations, the property interests of innocent third
parties could be subject to levy and forced sale. 9 The Court also re5 cases.
0 Kocher,91 Washington9 2 and Overman"
ferred to the Trilling,"
Although the Court did not specifically discuss these cases, it cited to
them in a string citation as an indication of the prevailing view that
the plain meaning of section 7403 should control."'
Perhaps unnecessarily, the majority also relied upon an analogy
between the federal government's authority under section 7403 and a
state government's powers in in rem proceedings to force the sale of
property to satisfy ad valorem taxes even if there are multiple owners
prejudice the government "(because the separate market value of the partial interest is likely to
be equal to or greater than its value as a fraction of the total value of the entire property) then
there would be no reason at all to authorize a sale of the entire property." Id.
83. Id. at 2151.
84. Id. See also id. at 2145. The majority illustrated how one might value a homestead
interest by equating it with a life estate and then making use of actuarial tables. Id. at 2145.
85. Id. at 2152.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2143.
88. 135 U.S. 326 (1890).
89. Id. at 339.
90. 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964).
91. 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972).
92. 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968).
93. 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
94. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2141-42.
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of the property. 5 A state in rem sale cuts off the interests of all joint
owners.9 6 The majority claimed that one evident purpose of section
7403 was to provide the federal tax collector some of the advantages
that many state tax collectors possess due to in rem tax enforcement. 7 Although state in rem proceedings do not require that third
parties share in the proceeds of a forced sale, the Court noted that
section 7403's requirement of an apportionment of the proceeds
showed the federal government's greater solicitude for third parties."
After examining precedent and drawing its analogy to state in
rem proceedings, the majority returned to the actual wording of section 7403.11 It compared section 7403 with section 6331, finding that
while section 6331 authorizes a sale only of property and rights to
property belonging to the taxpayer, section 7403 authorizes a sale of
any property in which the taxpayer has any right, title or interest.110
By virtue of section 7403, the Court declared any analogy between
the federal government and an ordinary creditor inappropriate. Although the tax collector under section 6331 may exercise only the
rights of the delinquent taxpayer, 10 ' such a limitation is not inherent
in the government's tax collecting authority. 0 2 Section 7403 represents the "exercise of a sovereign prerogative" and is ultimately
rooted in the constitutional power to "lay and collect taxes."' 03 The
majority claimed there would be little or no reason for section 7403 to
exist if its literal wording were not followed. If the only property that
could be the subject of a forced sale were the taxpayer's "property"
or "rights to property," sections 6321 and 6331 would be sufficient.
The majority reasoned that section 7403 must grant authority in excess of that granted by section 6331.104
Furthermore, the Court concluded section 7403 is designed specifically to handle the concerns of third parties who hold interests in
property with tax debtors. Section 7403(b) provides that all persons
"claiming any interest in the property" must be made parties to ac95. Id. at 2143.
96. Id., quoting Rogge, The Tax Lien of the United States, 13 A-BA J. 576, 577 (1927).
97. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2143.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. See I.R.C. §§ 6331, 7403 (West 1984).
101. The "step in the shoes" language is drawn from the analysis invoked by the dissent
in Rodgers. 103 S. Ct. at 2154 n.3, at 2159 n.16 (Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Basically, the proposition propounded by the dissent
and rejected by the majority is that the government has no greater power over the property
than tax debtors themselves have.
102. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2146.
103. Id. at 2144, quoting U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, and amend. XVI.
104. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2144.
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tions brought by the government under section 7403.1"' This
mandatory joinder of parties would be unnecessary if section 7403
did not permit the government to levy on the entire parcel of
property. 06
Recognizing the only weakness in its literal language argument,
the Court pointed out that section 7403 authorizes the sale of property in which the taxpayer has any interest. 10 7 The present tense
seems to imply the need for the delinquent taxpayer to have a current interest in the property. 0 8 Since Bosco was deceased at the time
the Rodgers case was brought, he had no current interest in the property. The majority felt this literal reading of the present tense was
inconsistent with the purpose of section 7403. Placing too great an
emphasis on the word "has" would require the government to have
levied before Bosco died. Partially relying on section 690119 which
imposes tax liability on transferees of the interests of tax debtors, 10
the majority noted that Bosco's interests were now held by his estate
or heirs."' This present holder had a future interest in Bosco's onehalf of the community property which would become possessory
when Mrs. Rodgers' homestead interest terminated." 2
The Supreme Court declared that section 7403 does not require
3
the sale of all property in which the tax debtor has any interest."
Instead, section 7403 permits such a sale in the appropriate circumstances. Although the statute specifically says "may, 11 4 indicating
that courts have discretion, the majority in Rodgers found a strict
105. Id. See also I.R.C. § 7403(b) (West 1984).
106. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2144.
107. Id. at 2142 n.18. See also I.R.C. § 7403(a) (West 1984) (emphasis added).
108. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2142.
109. I.R.C. § 6901 (West 1984).
110. Id.
111. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2142 n.18 ("Bosco's interests seem now to be held by his estate
or heirs ..
").
112. Bosco's one-half interest would pass to his estate or heirs independent of Mrs. Rodgers' disposition of her property because the property is community property. Id. Interestingly,
however, had the property been jointly held property in a common law jurisdiction, Bosco's
interest would have terminated at his death. In such a case, the "has" language of the statute
should perhaps be disregarded.
A tax debtor's interest in property held as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship
would terminate at his death. He would no longer have any interest in the property. Acquisition
of complete ownership by the surviving joint tenant is generally not looked upon as a transfer
and, therefore, the survivor would not incur a transferee's liability. Tooley v. Commissioner,
121 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1941). The government might be forced to seek a forced sale of joint
tenancy property before the tax debtor dies. "It is doubtful that even a federal tax which was
assessed and became a lien before death can be collected from the joint property after the
taxpayer dies." Plumb, FederalLiens and Priorities- Agenda for the Next Decade II, 77 YALE
L.J. 605, 632 (1968).
113. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2148.
114. I.R.C. § 7403(a) (West 1984).
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interpretation unnecessary in determining that equitable concerns
pervade section 7403.115 According to the Rodgers majority equitable
concerns require the district courts to weigh the government's interest in prompt collection of taxes against the rights of innocent third
parties with interests in the property." 6 The court should consider
whether the government would be prejudiced by the sale of only the
tax debtor's interest. Prejudice to the government must be determined as a matter of degree. 1 17 The court should compare what the
government could get for the tax debtor's interest alone, with what
the government could retain after selling the entire property and reimbursing the innocent property holders."18
Additionally, the district courts should weigh the relative character and value of the different interests in the property. 1 9 A sale of
the property might be less appropriate if the value of the tax debtor's
interest in the property is significantly less than the value of interests
held by other persons in that same property.2 S Another equitable
concern is the expectation of the third parties. Some vitality in statecreated definitions might still exist if third parties, based on the nature of interests they held under state law, had expectations that
their interests could not be disenfranchised by action or inaction of
the tax debtor. The majority in Rodgers indicated that it was not
formulating a mechanical checklist and that the discretion afforded
by section 7403 was limited and should be exercised only in view of
the government's paramount need to promptly collect taxes.' 21
22
The Rodgers Court also recognized that fifth amendment rights'
of third parties against wrongful takings are involved and should be
considered by the district courts.'2 3 The government may under no
115. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2150. The dissent in Rodgers emphasized the use of the word
"shall" rather than "may" in a predecessor statute to § 7403. The dissent believed that a strict
constructionist view similar to the one invoked by the majority would have required a sale
under the previous statute. Id. at 2158 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See also Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 740, § 802, 49 Stat. 1648, 1743-44 (1936). The
majority rejected such an analysis and claimed that the "unexplained change in statutory wording from 'shall' to 'may' is best construed as indicating a congressional belief that equitable
discretion existed all along." Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2150, citing Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312
U.S. 630, 635 (1941).
116. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2151.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2151 n.40.
119. Id. at 2152.
120. For example, if the tax debtor's only interest in the property were a short-term lease,
it would seem to weigh against the authorization of a § 7403 sale when the innocent lessor
would suffer the loss of his property.
121. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2152 (emphasis added).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
123. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2151.
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circumstances collect more than the value of the property interest
held by the tax debtor. 2 4 The rest of the proceeds must be returned
to the affected third parties upon the sale of the property.'2 5 The
majority therefore directed the district courts to determine the
prejudice to third parties which might result because of the inadequacy of compensation. 2 6 Financial compensation might not always
127
be an adequate substitute for the property.
The minority opinion saw the new interpretation of section 7403
as a drastic departure from previous interpretations of the government's collection power.1 28 The minority felt that Mrs. Rodgers'
state-created property right could not be overcome by section 7403
choosing to view the federal government as "stepping into the shoes"
of the tax debtor. 129 It reasoned that the common law principle limiting the lien rights of the government to those property rights possessed by the debtor limited the reach of section 7403.130 This interpretation, the dissent recognized, would still justify the sale of
property held by joint tenants and tenants in common because the
debtor, as a joint owner, could force the partition and sale of such
property.
The dissent found the majority's interpretation of the literal
meaning of section 7403 inconsistent with prior interpretations given
to the section.' 3 ' Indicating that Congress had repeatedly addressed
the issue of federal tax liens, the minority noted that Congress had
never allowed such liens, under any section of the Code, to disenfranchise one who held a homestead property interest. 1 32 Indeed,
Congress had previously considered extending the reach of federal
124. Id. at 2144-45, 2151 & n.40.
125. Id. at 2144.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2148.
128. Id. at 2152 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id. at 2154 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. See also J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 24 ("The rights of
the Government when attempting to establish its lien to property of a delinquent taxpayer are,
however, never better than those which the taxpayer had."); Clark, Federal Tax Liens and
Their Enforcement, 33 VA. L. REV. 13 (1947).
It is obvious, of course, that the federal tax lien can only reach the property of its taxdebtor and that its rights as lienor to property or rights to property of its tax-debtor can
rise no higher than the rights of the latter in that property or rights to property.
Id. at 17.
131. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2154. The dissent drew an analogy between § 7403 and the
broad language in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (a civil rights statute) and stated that if "broadly
worded statutes, particularly those of some antiquity, are in derogation of common-law principles, [the] Court has hesitated to heed arguments that they should be applied literally." Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2154 & n.5.
132. Id. at 2155-56.
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tax liens to tenancies by the entirety, but had rejected such an
133
approach.
The minority also found little precedential support for the extension adopted by the majority. It viewed Excelsior Refining 34 as
clearly distinguishable because the statute involved in that case provided for a signed consent by affected third parties before the prop13 6
erty could be subject to levy.13 5 Trilling
and Kocher1 37 were not
distinguished because, based on the "step in the shoes" analysis,
these cases were consistent with the dissent's conclusion. 138 Apparently, the dissenting justices disagreed with Overman3 9 and Washington 4 0 although they made no mention of these decisions. The minority did cite scholarly works to support its conclusion that section
7403 did not allow the sale of property subject to a homestead
right.M These works maintained that the homestead property rights
of an unindebted spouse may not be sold by the government to pay
1 42
the other spouse's taxes.
The minority also rejected the majority's analogy between state in
rem proceedings and a section 7403 sale, declaring that in rem proceedings were based on a finding that the land itself was liable for
the tax. 43 An in rem proceeding was, therefore, not comparable to a
forced sale where the taxpayer as an individual was liable for the tax.
The fact that joint owners in an in rem proceeding were not entitled
to compensation highlighted the difference between the two types of
44
forced sales.1
The dissent attacked the majority's reasoning that a literal interpretation of section 7403 would further the governmental policy of
prompt collection of taxes, finding this basis for the decision in con133. Id. at 2156.
134. 135 U.S. 326 (1890).
135. Id. at 338. See also An Act imposing Taxes on distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for
other Purposes, § 8, 15 Stat. 125, 128 (1868).
136. 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964).
137. 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972).
138. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2159. See also id. at 2153 n.2 (the dissent concedes that the
Folsom case was incorrect in not allowing government sale of jointly held property). See 306
F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
139. 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
140. 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968).
141. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2155 n.6.
142. Id. at 2155.
143. Id. at 2160, citing 2 T. COOLEY, LAW OF TAxAroN 866-67 (1903) ("[T]he lien does not
stand on the same footing with an ordinary encumbrance, but attaches itself to the res without
regard to individual ownership ....
"). The taxes contemplated by § 7403 are of a different
nature altogether in that the liability for those taxes is personal rather than based on the property itself.
144. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2160.
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travention of common sense and the traditional rules of law. 14 5 The
possibility of a favorable outcome for the government should not determine the decision. 46 The dissent disagreed with the majority's
declaration that section 7403 would add nothing to the collection
power of the government if it was not interpreted as reaching "property" beyond the ambit of section 6331. Even absent such an extension, section 7403 was necessary to enable the government to sell
jointly held property when the tax debtor's property rights would
47
have allowed him to seek a forced sale.'

VI.

ANALYSIS OF

United States v. Rodgers

The dissent in Rodgers faced a formidable task when it held that
section 7403 did not mean what the plain language of the statute
seemed to express. Despite this impediment, a certain amount of
logic supports the reasoning of the Rodgers dissent. The minority was
apparently unconcerned with the impact of a broad interpretation on
homestead rights. Actually, homestead rights, as interpreted by some
states, cannot provide protection to a person in Mrs. Rodgers' situation because these rights are considered state-created exemptions,
not binding on federal courts. 48 Even the Fifth Circuit has held that
a spouse's homestead rights, under Florida law, are exemptions which
do not protect the property subject to them. 49 The dissent also was
probably unconcerned that the new interpretation of section 7403
would impact on dower rights or rights in community property. 50
The majority decision probably troubled the dissent for two principal reasons. First, the Court diminished the traditional deference to
property rights as defined by state law. Early case law clearly established that state law determinations of property interests bound the
federal tax system. 5 ' Essentially, a state had the power to shield cer145. Id. at 2158.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Herndon v. United States, 501 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (8th Cir. 1974) (Arkansas homestead exemption does not bar sale of property by government); Weitzner v. United States, 309
F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1962) (Florida homestead exemption does not bar sale of property by the
government), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963); United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 427 (8th
Cir. 1960) (North Dakota homestead exemption does not bar sale of property by government);
United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1947). See
also Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345, 364 (5th Cir. 1942) (Texas homestead right held by
children of property owners does not bar sale of property by the government).
149. Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1962).
150. The dissent does not address the possibility that Mrs. Rodgers' community property
rights might create an interest in the property sufficient to impede governmental sale of the
property. At least tacit acquiescence by the dissenters exists in the Washington and Overman
decisions.
151. See, e.g., Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960); Poe v. Seaborn, 282

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss5/6

16

Hernandez: The Federal Tax Lien: Beyond United States v. Rodgers
1984]

FEDERAL TAX LIENS

tain types of property interests from the federal government's reach
when it collected taxes. Although a clear indication was required that
the state-created property interest was more than a mere creditor's
exemption, the power was rightfully the state's since the state was
the sovereign more intimately connected with property and with per152
sons holding such property.
The Rodgers majority apparently decided that the state power to
determine property rights was insufficient to overcome a literal interpretation of section 7403. Some justification impliedly exists for denying deference to the states. Federal taxation should aim for consistent application regardless of the particular state in which a federal
taxpayer resides. 153 The Supreme Court had not previously addressed
this issue. In light of the need for consistency, however, the earlier
non-use of section 7403 did not lessen the power of this argument
when finally addressed.
The minority's concern for state-created definitions of property is
secondary to the other justification behind the dissent. Namely, a literal interpretation of section 7403 opens the door for a quantum leap
in the reach of the federal government's collection power. The courts
previously were required to examine the property interests held by
innocent third parties to determine whether the government could
force a sale. Under the Rodgers rationale, in determining the application of section 7403 the courts must merely examine whether the tax
debtor holds or held any interests. 54 The dissent's concern becomes
evident when one considers how tenuous some interests in property
are. Indeed, the tax debtor's interest might be inferior both quantitatively and qualitatively to the interests of innocent third parties.
The dissent was particularly concerned about the sanctity of the
tenancy by the entirety. 155 It attempted to use Congress' failure to
allow tax liens to reach tenancies by the entirety to bolster its argument that homestead rights could not be reached under section
7403.156 Tenancies by the entirety present a special problem because
the property, instead of being held by either party individually, is
held by an entity, the marital unit. 157 In such a case, the dissent argued, a tax lien could not attach to one party's interest alone and,
therefore, section 7403 would not authorize the sale of entireties
U.S. 101,
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

110-13 (1930). See also Clark, supra note 130, at 17.
Rogers, 649 F.2d at 1127.
Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930).
Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2146.
Id. at 2156-57.
Id.
Id. at 2147 n.31. See United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1951).

See also Clark, supra note 130, at 17.
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property. 15 Indeed, earlier courts had held that a tenancy by the entirety represented the one property interest beyond the reach of the
government's tax lien.' 59
Rodgers potentially disrupts this conceptualization of property
because of the broad reach it accorded section 7403. Under Rodgers
the government can force the sale of any property in which the tax
debtor has any interest whatsoever. A third party cannot logically
claim that a person who holds property in a tenancy by the entirety
has no interest in that property. 6 ' Clearly, a literal reading of section
7403 would invade the tenancy by the entirety sanctuary. The majority in Rodgers intimated that although Congress had rejected specific
authorization for tax liens upon tenancy by the entirety property,
such property interests were not necessarily excluded from tax liens.
Rather, Congress might have viewed such clarification as
unnecessary.1
Even if courts were to exclude tenancies by the entirety from the
reach of government tax collectors, Rodgers provides the government
with another potentially potent weapon in its collection arsenal. If
the only finding necessary to warrant a forced sale is that the tax
debtor has or had an interest in the property, third parties' property
interests can be adversely affected. For example, an easement is
clearly an interest in property. 62 Although a person holding an easement in a parcel of property could not force the sale of that property,
the Rodgers decision might permit the government to do so.
Other property interests also demonstrate the possible consequences of a literal interpretation of section 7403. A tax debtor's interest in a cooperative' 6 3 might be deemed a property interest that is
subject to sale. Even a delinquent lessee could provide the government the power to sell property actually owned by an innocent
feeholder.6 4 This absurd result is especially plausible under Rodgers,
considering the Court's favorable citation to Excelsior Refining
158. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2147 n.31.
159. W. PLUMB, supra note 24, at 37. See also Plumb, supra note 112, at 634-41.
160. If the tenancy by the entirety is looked upon as a separate entity and the tax debtor
holds an interest in that entity, that interest might be considered similar to the interest stock
represents in a corporate entity. Cf. Plumb, supra note 112, at 605, 636 & n.206. See C.I.T.
Corp. v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 354, 5 A.2d 126, 128 (1939) (analogizing the tenancy by the entirety
to the corporate entity).
161. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2:47-48 n.31.
162. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 2 (1966).
163. Exactly what interest is held by one who holds an interest in a cooperative housing
project is not entirely clear. It might be looked upon as essentially a long-term proprietary
lease. 15A AM. JUR. 2D. Condominiums and Co-operatives Apartments § 78 (1976).
164. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 1 (1970).
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Co.,'6 5 which involved a leasing situation.
Moreover, courts could conceivably find ownership of a unit in a
time-share condominium an interest in property. 6 6 If this property
interest were sufficient to invoke section 7403, a delinquent taxpayer
could cause the sale of a significant parcel of property which the taxpayer did not have the power to alienate. Previously, the Internal
Revenue Service ruled that a section 6321 tax lien could attach only
to the specific unit of time held by the delinquent taxpayer and not
to the interests of other owners in that condominium unit or to the
unit itself. 67 This precedent now provides little comfort to affected
third parties because, under Rodgers, the attachment of the lien to
the delinquent taxpayer's interest alone would seem to permit a sale
of the entire parcel to satisfy the lien.
The Supreme Court did, however, instruct the district courts to
consider equitable factors in their application of section 7403. By
providing that equitable factors be considered, the Court prevented a
68
literal reading of section 7403 from mandating such absurd results.
The discretionary power of courts to force a sale under section 7403
greatly vitiates the reasoning of the Rodgers dissent, 6 9 and acts as
some assurance that a section 7403 sale will occur only when the facts
70
warrant it.'
Under the Rodgers approach, a determination must first be made
regarding the value of the varying interests held in the property. This
valuation is necessary not only to determine the compensation due
innocent third parties whose interests might be alienated, but also to
determine whether a section 7403 sale should even be ordered.' 71 The
relative values of each party's interest are explored prior to authorization of a section 7403 sale. 7 2 State-created property definitions
control the value placed on the interest held by each of the parties.
This control provides states that can no longer absolutely protect
particular property interests held by innocent third parties with a
different means of protection. In defining interests, states are able to
make an innocent third party's interest relatively more valuable than
that of the tax debtor.
165. Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U.S. 326 (1890).
166. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.103 (Supp. 1984).
167. Rev. Rul. 79-55, 1979-1 C.B. 400.
168. Courts should not automatically authorize a § 7403 sale because of equitable considerations. A judicial inquiry should keep sales from taking place in situations where the tax
debtor's interest in the property is greatly inferior to that of other persons holding interests in
the property.
169. The dissent, in essence, asks that § 7403 be held not to mean what it literally says.
170. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2152.
171. Id. at 2142-45, 2151-52.
172. Id. at 2152.
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Courts may also protect third parties through their determination
of the compensation due these parties. The Supreme Court has held,
in another context, that the compensation may exceed the value of
the property interest taken by the government. Such factors as the
reasonable cost of moving and the storage of goods may be considered in compensating innocent property holders.17 s Other equitable
concerns may also operate to minimize the unjustified alienation of
third-party interests.'
The equitable considerations expressly stated by the court are not
the only factors that could discourage the application of section 7403.
The government must determine, for each parcel of property in
which the taxpayer holds an interest, whether to invoke section
7403.1' As section 7403 requires the government to institute suit in a
federal district court, the process can be both costly and lengthy. 17 6
Taxpayers in district court actions may request juries, further increasing the cost of the litigation and providing the taxpayers a potentially more favorable fact-finder.1 77 The displacement of innocent
7
third parties might often create jury sympathy.
The Rodgers extension of section 7403 might, therefore, be more
valuable to the government as a threat than for practical purposes.
This threat might provide innocent third parties with the impetus to
pressure the tax debtor to satisfy the debt rather than face the possibility of a forced sale of the entire parcel. Additionally, innocent
third parties might choose to pay the tax debt themselves rather than
lose their property, especially in situations where the innocent third
party is not so "innocent. '1 79 For example, one spouse now might
173. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). This case dealt with the
proper amount of compensation required when the government exercised its condemnation
power under the Second War Powers Act of 1942, § 201 and condemned a long-term leasehold
interest held by General Motors in certain storage facilities. Id. at 375, 383.
174. See supra notes 113-27 and accompanying text.
175. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2145-46 ("Of course, the exercise in any particular case of the
power granted under § 7403 to seek the forced sale of property interests other than those of the
delinquent taxpayer is left in the first instance to the good sense and common decency of the
collecting authorities.").
176. A § 6331 levy requires no court action whereas § 7403 does not require that a district
court exercise its jurisdiction. See I.R.C. §§ 6331, 7403 (West Supp. 1984).
177. No right to a jury trial exists under § 7403. See, e.g., United States v. Annis, 634
F.2d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 1980); Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1119, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969); United States v. Warren, 235 F.
Supp. 638, 639 (W.D.N.C. 1964). Cf. Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101, 105 (1927).
178. One can envision a case in which the government would attempt to sell property in
which a widow with six minor children held a homestead interest.
179. This, of course, raises problems of attributing income to the tax debtor. Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929).
The companion case to Rodgers, Ingram v. City of Dallas, Dep't of Hous. & Urban Rehab.,
649 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 659 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 904
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have a greater impetus to satisfy the tax debt of another spouse. A
lessor might choose to pay the tax debt of a lessee rather than lose
his property. In essence, the government could use section 7403 to
turn joint property holders into collection agents.
VII.

PLANNING CONCERNS

Persons holding property jointly or persons planning to buy property with others now face additional considerations and concerns. Potential joint owners might want to structure their interests to provide
maximum safeguards from the application of section 7403. Property
owners should now be concerned with the tax history of any person
to whom they intend to grant easements. They might want to provide
specific spatial and/or time limitations on the interest granted to diminish the value of the interests held by potential tax debtors relative to the value of the interest retained. Their precautions might,
however, be to no avail as an easement is virtually unmarketable.
The government might have no choice except to sell the entire property if it is to realize any money. I"0
Persons might place greater emphasis on the nature of their interests in property. For example, a husband and wife holding property
as tenants in common or as joint tenants might desire to change the
form of ownership to a tenancy by the entirety, although no guarantees exist that such a tenancy is protected from a sale under section
7403. Other persons holding property as joint tenants or tenants in
common might want to transfer ownership to a corporate entity.
Property titled in the corporate name would limit a tax debtor's interest to his stock in the corporation. The government would be unable to force the sale of the underlying property unless the tax debtor
had sufficient stock holdings to warrant the sale. Of course, any
changes in the form of ownership would be void if the tax debt was
already owing and the transaction was merely a sham. 8 '
Lessors could avoid application of section 7403 by granting shortterm leases with an option to renew. This device would diminish the
lessee's interest in the property because an option to renew is a contractual right rather than a property interest. 182 Value could also be
diminished by making interests terminable upon an event such as
(1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983), presents a clear picture of how a minimal liability on
the part of the co-holder can permit a sale of the entire property.
180. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. at 2158 n.13. During oral argument "It]he government indicated
that it would exercise its discretion to sell just the easement 'where there is a separate market'
for it." Id. (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 9-10). One can possibly infer that if there is no separate
market for the easement, the entire parcel of property would be sold.
181. Plumb, supra note 112, at 636-37 & n.210.
182. See 17 AM. Jur. 2D Contracts § 32 (1964).
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nonpayment of taxes by one party. Courts have, however, held similar limitations invalid in the bankruptcy area.' 83
All of these considerations are speculative at best. When property
holders can no longer rely on state-created protections they are
forced to venture into unexplored territory. The equitable concerns
voiced in Rodgers constitute the only available guidance in this confused area. Since the application of section 7403 will be on a case-bycase basis, potential innocent third parties can only structure their
property interests so as to minimize the possibility for attack under
section 7403.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Rodgers decision departs from the deference previously afforded states in protecting certain classes of property from the reach
of the federal tax collector. The effectiveness of the "new" section
7403 as a weapon in the government's collection arsenal remains to
be seen. The ability retained by the states to determine the values of
the underlying property interests in a parcel of property permits an
inconsistent application of the federal revenue statute. In our system
of federalism, however, perfect consistency sometimes must give way
to a greater state prerogative.
The literal construction rationale presents the most cogent argument supporting the majority's position. The wording of section 7403
is not vague or ambiguous. By relying on the literal wording of section 7403, the majority forces the dissent into the uncomfortable position of reasoning that section 7403 does not mean what it says. Although the dissent stated that a literal interpretation of section 7403
granted lienholders greater rights than debtors over the property, the
wording of the statute simply does not lend itself to the dissent's interpretation. The Tax Code in its complex morass should be interpreted literally when such an interpretation does not lead to absurd
results. In light of the equitable constraints imposed by the majority
and the practical constraints existing in any given situation, the
Court's holding does no injustice to the statute. The decision in Rodgers, although recognizing the lingering possibility of some state manipulation, is a step forward in both statutory interpretation and
application.
JOHN

F.

HERNANDEZ

183. See, e.g., In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1975); Queens
Blvd. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1974); Weaver v. Hudson,
459 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335
F.2d 857, 862 (3d Cir. 1964); National Shoes, Inc. v. 901 Boulevard Realty Corp., 20 B.R. 55, 58
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982).'
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